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ABSTRACT 
The United States Department of Defense (DoD) spends hundreds of 
millions of dollars each year on desktop computer software.  While some of this 
expenditure goes to fund special-purpose military software, much of it is 
absorbed by license fees for computer operating systems and general purpose 
office automation applications.  Although many of these tools may serve their 
respective purposes rather well, there are many reasons to consider adopting 
alternative software solutions alongside the existing standards.  Improvements to 
cost, security, and flexibility are some of the benefits that may be realized by 
integrating some of the many available mature, robust Open Source Software 
(OSS) solutions.  In particular, Linux-based operating systems have helped bring 
free, open source software into mainstream use in businesses, homes, and 
government offices around the world, precisely because of these potential 
benefits.  This thesis examines the feasibility of using OSS, particularly Linux-
based operating systems, on unclassified DoD desktop computers.  Specific 
attention is paid to performing office automation tasks that are currently handled 
by U.S. Air Force Standard Desktop Configuration, Windows-based computers.  
Additionally, this document examines many of the regulations and policies that 
shape the procurement and operational environments in which OSS must 
compete and function. 
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This document was written entirely using the OpenOffice.org 2.3 word 
processor running on the Ubuntu 7.10 Linux-based operating system.  Online 
research was conducted using the Firefox web browser, and research e-mails 
were exchanged primarily by means of the Evolution e-mail client.  These last 
two applications were used (as required) in conjunction with the Common Access 
Card for interoperability with the Department of Defense Public Key 
Infrastructure.  All of the software products mentioned are open source software.  
They all proved more than adequate for their respective tasks, and all of them 
were legally free to download, use, and (if so desired) modify.  In the intervening 
months since this research project was started, each of these tools have also 
been actively maintained, released as updated versions with sometimes 
significantly enhanced features.  I would like to thank the open source 
community; individuals, government agencies and corporations who helped 
develop this amazing array of software. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. OBJECTIVE 
The United States Department of Defense spends hundreds of millions of 
dollars each year on desktop computer software.  While some of this expenditure 
goes to fund special-purpose military software, much of it is absorbed by license 
fees for computer operating systems and general-purpose office automation 
applications.  Although many of these tools may serve their respective purposes 
rather well, there is reason to consider adopting alternative software solutions 
alongside the existing standards.  Improvements to cost, security and flexibility 
are some of the benefits that may be realized by integrating some of the many 
open source software solutions that now exist.  In particular, Linux-based 
operating systems have helped bring free, open source software into the 
mainstream in businesses, homes and government offices around the world, 
precisely because of these potential benefits.   
The Department of Defense (DoD) has made use of Linux-based systems 
in both the classified and server arenas, but there is room for increased use.  The 
objective of this thesis is to examine the feasibility of incorporating Linux-based 
operating systems and other open source desktop application software 
alternatives on desktop computers across Department of Defense unclassified 
networks.   
B. SCOPE 
This thesis will begin with an examination of the current state of 
unclassified desktop software on Department of Defense computer systems, in 
part to determine what type of functionality and interoperability must be provided 
by any prospective open source solutions.  The analysis will then focus on the 
integration of Linux-based systems into a Windows-dominated local area 
network.  Server configurations are beyond the scope of the present paper, 
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which will focus solely on unclassified desktop technology.  It is worth noting that 
many of the assembled facts and conclusions also apply to the DoD classified 
network environment. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
z What, if any, are the potential advantages and disadvantages of 
introducing open source operating systems and other applications into the 
unclassified network environment? 
z Can open source-based desktops integrate seamlessly into a network of 
primarily Windows-based servers and desktop clients?   
z Can open source-based desktops accommodate the burgeoning Public 
Key Infrastructure, to include the Common Access Card token? 
z How do federal government and Department of Defense regulations affect 
the procurement and use of open source software?   
D. OUTLINE AND CHAPTER ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized as follows: 
Chapter II provides the reader with an overview of open source software 
and its applicability to the Department of Defense.  Special attention is paid to the 
Linux kernel and derived operating system distributions.  Next, the discussion 
moves to current unclassified desktop systems, with an emphasis on the 
standardized configuration used by the U.S. Air Force. 
Chapter III continues with an examination of how open source software 
might be able to satisfy the needs of the user as they are currently met by the 
current U.S. Air Force proprietary software setup.  A separate section is devoted 
to open source software interoperability with the Department of Defense Public 
Key Infrastructure and Common Access Card, due to their increasing 
significance.  The chapter concludes with a review of open source software 
security. 
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Chapter IV begins with an overview of significant federal and Department 
of Defense information assurance policies that regulate the use of open source 
(and proprietary) software on official networks.  The chapter continues with a look 
at some of the legal and technical challenges facing widespread Department of 
Defense adoption of open source software. 
Finally, Chapter V briefly covers acquisition policy and offers 
recommendations to any Department of Defense officials who may be in a 
position to procure open source software for their respective agencies.  It 
concludes with a brief list of topics that were perhaps beyond the scope of this 
thesis, but warrant further study. 
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1. Open Source Software Introduction 
General purpose computer workstation software can be categorized in 
many ways, such as by function, target architecture, or cost.  One of the most 
fundamental and increasingly important distinctions lies in the accessibility to and 
licensing of a program’s source code.  This code is the human-readable, though 
perhaps arcane-looking blueprint of a program’s design.  With the source code, a 
programmer can review the underlying design of a program and make any 
conceivable change to that program’s functionality.  By means of a compiler, the 
programmer can then transform the code into a binary format that only the 
computer can interpret.  At that point, the program can be run as a potentially 
useful tool like a web browser or word processor, but it can no longer be 
modified, and its inner workings cannot be examined.  Therefore, free and legal 
access to the source code grants the user or operating agency considerable 
power and control.  Commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS) software for which source 
code is freely available is known as Open Source Software (OSS).  The Open 
Source Initiative (http://www.opensource.org) further refines the OSS definition to 
include free redistribution of source code and permission to modify and 
redistribute derivative works, among other things. 
Conversely, the Department of the Navy (DON) Chief Information Officer 
established in 2007 that “commands will treat OSS as COTS when it meets the 
definition of a commercial item . . .   This will allow the DON to utilize OSS 
throughout the enterprise when acquiring capabilities to meet DON business and 
warfighter requirements” (U.S. DON CIO, 2007).  Due to the public availability of 
source code, mature OSS products are often the result of considerable public 
collaboration.  And since most contributors (including those from numerous 
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corporations such as IBM, Oracle and Google) would object to having their work 
surreptitiously bundled up and sealed into another vendor’s closed-source 
product, OSS is typically distributed with one of several licenses that demand re-
release of any modified source whenever modified binary files are published.  
Partly because of these licenses, the software is usually (though not always) 
available free of charge, if only in a non-compiled, source-only format.  Clearly, 
the up-front cost savings can be significant if a software package is available for 
free.  However, many popular OSS operating systems and applications are sold 
in a more usable, pre-compiled format by companies who tailor their products to 
meet certain needs and hope to generate sales largely on the basis of continuing 
support.  One example is the Red Hat Corporation, which sells Red Hat 
Enterprise Linux in both desktop and various server configurations.  The source 
code to these products is still available free of charge.  
OSS such as Red Hat Enterprise Linux is already in use throughout the 
Department of Defense (DoD) in everything from embedded vehicle computers to 
highly relied-upon directory and web servers.  In their 2003 report commissioned 
by the Defense Information Systems Agency, MITRE came to the conclusion that 
“FOSS software plays a far more critical role in the DoD than has been generally 
recognized. The value of FOSS to the DoD appears to be greatest in four broad 
categories: Infrastructure Support, Software Development, Security, and 
Research” (MITRE, 2003, p. 17).  In fact, it will likely serve as the basis for the 
U.S. Army’s Future Combat Systems (Klein, 2008).  It has, however, failed to 
make inroads in the general-purpose DoD desktop computing environment.  
Possible reasons for this are many and varied, but the most visible and 
significant barrier to entry is undoubtedly the dominant global market share of the 
Microsoft Windows operating systems and accompanying Office productivity 
suite.  Having established a massive user base with applications, file formats and 
network protocols that are exclusive to the Windows/Office environment, 
Microsoft has developed the de facto standard for desktop computing.  
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 Those who would stray from this path risk sacrificing interoperability, 
perhaps even with their organization’s own legacy programs and data files.  
However, considerable progress has been made in recent years to allow OSS 
programs to work with Microsoft Office files and interact with Windows-based 
computers.  Full Application Programming Interface (API) compatibility remains 
the major stumbling block, but with the advent of web-based computing, many 
applications are now web-dependent instead of OS-dependent (Boutin, 2006).  
These facts, along with OSS offerings that rival their closed-source counterparts, 
are making OSS an increasingly attractive alternative to businesses and 
governments around the world (CSIS, 2007). 
By the very nature of its name, Open Source Software brings perhaps its 
biggest benefit to the table: peer review.  The quality benefits imparted by code 
review cannot be overstated.  By some estimates, inspections eliminate 70 to 80 
percent of all software defects (Petross, MN3331 lecture, Winter 2008).  In his 
book Managing the Software Process, Watts Humphrey cites many noteworthy 
examples of the great successes companies have had in examining code, 
including the following: “In an AT&T Bell Laboratories dial-up central switching 
system application, inspections were reported to be 20 times more effective than 
testing in finding errors” (Humphrey, 1989, p. 185). 
2. Open Source Software Initial Acquisition Costs 
As previously mentioned, not all OSS is intended to be used for free.  The 
best example of this is Red Hat Enterprise Linux (RHEL).  Since it is an operating 
system largely derived from other publicly developed OSS, it is subject to several 
popular OSS licenses, including re-release of modified source code.  This is 
demanded in particular by the GNU (a recursive acronym for GNU's Not Unix) 
General Public License, perhaps the most popular OSS license in use.  While 
Red Hat is under no obligation to release free binary, immediately usable 
versions of its product, it must make the source code available.  Other entities 
can (and do) then take this code, re-compile it into binary form, and legally walk 
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away with a nearly identical, fully functional binary product.  The best-known 
example of this is CentOS, a product that is in almost every way a clone of 
RHEL, with Red Hat's trademarked logos removed.  
To create and protect a revenue stream, therefore, Red Hat requires that 
users of RHEL pay a subscription fee in order to download updates and 
additional programs from the Red Hat Network.  This fee also entitles users to 
unlimited web support with a two-business-day turnaround time.  The retail price 
for a one year, basic subscription to this service is $80, or three years for $228.  
“Security errata and select mission-critical bug fixes” are available for seven 
years from the general availability of the product.  By comparison, as of the 
writing of this paper, the latest version of Windows Vista Ultimate costs between 
$300 and $400 through most major web retailers.  It comes with 90 days of 
telephone support, after which users must pay a $59 per-call fee.  Bug fixes and 
other software updates are provided by Microsoft for a period of five years after 
product release.  The retail prices listed here would no doubt be significantly 
lower in the case of a bulk contract purchase.  And while the OSS offering in this 
case is cheaper than the proprietary alternative, these figures are used primarily 
to illustrate the point that OSS can carry a significant up-front financial cost.  On 
the other hand, it is worth pointing out that RHEL is not an operating system 
alone; it is delivered with a complete office suite (OpenOffice.org) and hundreds 
of other programs that can optionally be installed from the DVD media or through 
the Red Hat Network. 
3. Vendor Lock-in 
One major factor that exacerbates the cost dimension of proprietary 
software is vendor lock-in, which occurs when a customer becomes dependent 
on a piece of software (or hardware) to the extent that switching vendors would 
present significant challenges and costs.  Much of vendor lock-in is dependent on 
whether or not the software uses open communications protocols and document 
format specifications, but it can also apply to the underlying API’s.  In 2004, the 
 9
European Union (EU) Commission released a decision regarding Microsoft’s 
antitrust actions in the EU.  In it, they referenced an internal memo prepared for 
Bill Gates from Microsoft C++ General Manger Aaron Contorer (European 
Commission, 2004, p. 127): 
The Windows API is so broad, so deep, and so functional that most 
ISV's [Independent Software Vendors] would be crazy not to use it.  
And it is so deeply embedded in the source code of many Windows 
apps that there is a huge switching cost to using a different 
operating system instead . . . .   It is this switching cost that has 
given customers the patience to stick with Windows through all our 
mistakes, our buggy drivers, our high TCO [Total Cost of 
Ownership], our lack of a sexy vision at times, and many other 
difficulties . . . . Customers constantly evaluate other desktop 
platforms, [but] it would be so much work to move over that they 
hope we just improve Windows rather than force them to move.  In 
short, without this exclusive franchise called the Windows API, we 
would have been dead a long time ago . . .    
In the same document, Microsoft Senior Vice President Bob Muglia is 
quoted as saying “The Windows franchise is fueled by application development 
which is focused on our core API’s” (European Commission, 2004, p. 127). 
  The realities behind these powerful statements have been felt and 
understood by users, managers, developers and resellers throughout the 
computing world for almost two decades.  Those ISV’s that want to earn 
maximum profit from their coding efforts typically target the Windows API and 
corresponding user base.  This development results in a large pool of available 
Windows applications.  Correspondingly, users who want maximum commercial 
software choice tend to purchase Windows-based systems, creating a large 
Windows user base, and so on and so forth.   
Operating system-specific application development creates this interesting 
chicken-and-egg scenario for supply and demand, but there should be no such 
inherent dilemma for disparate interconnected computer systems.  However, 
when organizations choose proprietary software solutions with closed 
communication protocols, vendor lock-in occurs here, too.  For example, many 
information systems managers understand that if they wish to use Microsoft 
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Outlook in its native Mail API mode for corporate e-mail, calendar, task and other 
groupware functions, then they must continue to use Microsoft Exchange as the 
groupware server application.  And if they wish to use Exchange, they must run it 
on a Microsoft Windows-based server.  Likewise, if they want the Windows 
server to operate seamlessly with other corporate servers such as the directory 
and client management system, then it must all be tied together with Microsoft 
Active Directory.  (These relationships tend to hold true in reverse, too).  This 
inability to incorporate new, competing technologies from different vendors 
presents an interesting, if unfortunate cost variable far beyond the simple price 
point of the software.  Without a massive investment in infrastructure across the 
board, the organization is effectively locked-in to one vendor’s solutions.  The 
U.S. Navy’s Open Architecture Contract Guidebook addresses this in its Life 
Cycle Affordability checklist: “Have proprietary products been avoided to avoid 
vendor lock-in and sole source environments?” (PEO-IWS, 2006 p. 56). 
The U.S. Army seems to have recognized the potential for vendor lock-in 
and has addressed it in the Future Combat Systems (FCS) program.  In 
particular, the operating system software to be used across the FCS, known as 
they System of Systems Common Operating Environment (SYSCOE) is being 
developed by Boeing and will be based on Linux.  According to the Washington 
Post, “Boeing and the Army said they chose not to use Microsoft's proprietary 
software because they didn't want to be beholden to the company. Instead, they 
chose to develop a Linux-based operating system based on publicly available 
code” (Klein, 2008).  Although the entire SYSCOE platform will undoubtedly be a 
complex product, the OSS-based architecture may level the playing field for 
future support contracts; any number of Linux-savvy vendors could theoretically 
step in to assume programming and support roles. 
4. About the Linux Kernel 
Any casual discussion about OSS will likely include mention of Linux, as it 
is perhaps the most prominent piece of Free, Open Source Software in the world.  
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In everyday language, Linux has come to be known as a complete operating 
system, to include graphical user interface features and rich multimedia 
capabilities.  However, the word Linux officially refers only to the operating 
system kernel; that core piece of software that controls system hardware and 
allows the computer to interpret human language commands, among other 
things.  DoD information technology managers unfamiliar with Linux are often 
curious about who exactly owns and maintains this piece of technology upon 
which we already rely so heavily.  The Linux kernel is a patchwork of 
contributions by thousands of individuals, some working as volunteers and others 
in the employ of companies which may stand to benefit from improvement of the 
operating system.  In April 2008, the Linux Foundation published a study that 
cataloged contributions to the 2.6.x Linux kernel according to a series of metrics.  
The paper's authors attempted to track down the employers of Linux kernel 
developers in an effort to shed light on which companies were behind some of 
the kernel's growth.  Some of this research is summarized in Table 1 below.  The 
following excerpt clarifies the findings in the table:  
There are a number of developers for whom we were unable to 
determine a corporate affiliation; those are grouped under 
"unknown" . . . .  With few exceptions, all of the people in this 
category have contributed 10 or fewer changes to the kernel over 
the past three years, yet the large number of these developers 
causes their total contribution to be quite high. The category 
"None," instead, represents developers who are known to be doing 
this work on their own, with no financial contribution happening 
from any company. The top 10 contributors, including the groups 
"unknown" and "none" make up over 75% of the total contributions 
to the kernel. It is worth noting that, even if one assumes that all of 
the "unknown" contributors were working on their own time, over 
70% of all kernel development is demonstrably done by developers 




Table 1.   Kernel Lines of Code Changed, by Employer 
Source: Corbet et al., 2008 
 
 This 70% of paid kernel development is done not out of charity.  Rather, 
the backing corporations understand that OSS can be profitable.  A more 
capable and robust Linux kernel, devoid of licensing fees and royalties, makes an 
extremely powerful and cost-effective foundation on which to develop an ever-
growing number of information systems.  Linux is used in everything from 
embedded systems and network appliances to enterprise servers and some of 
the world's most powerful multi-processor supercomputers.  
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 Since the kernel updates are released on a schedule and contributions are 
checked or “signed off” by someone before public release, there must be some 
overarching authority maintaining responsibility and a degree of ownership.  In 
the purest sense, that authority is Linus Torvalds, the original kernel's creator.  In 
his book Open Life – The Philosophy of Open Source, Henrik Ingo colorfully 
explains the Torvalds' role as one of a “benevolent dictator,” albeit one with 
strangely limited power: 
What would happen if for some reason Linus decided to screw 
things up and out of spite started making stupid decisions for 
Linux? Within twenty-four hours the other Linux developers would 
leave him to fool around on his own, make a copy of the Linux 
source code somewhere Linus couldn’t get his hands on it and 
keep working without him. It’s also extremely likely that the hackers 
involved would quickly elect – more or less consciously and more 
or less democratically – a new benevolent dictator. 
All that is possible because the code itself is open and freely 
available for anyone to use. As dictator, Linus has all the authority 
while at the same time having no power whatsoever. The others 
see him as their leader only because he is so talented – or 
benevolent. There is a fascinating equilibrium of power and 
freedom. The dictator has the power and the others have the 
freedom to vote with their feet. 
While Linus Torvalds retains this “ownership” of the kernel, in practice, 
and due to the volume of code in question, other individuals have assumed 
responsibility for different branches.  According to Ingo (p. 45):                                               
Linus in particular takes the advice of his closest and longer-term 
colleagues, who within the community are known as his lieutenants. 
These lieutenants are like mini-dictators, and each one has their 
own area of responsibility within the project. Just as for Linus, their 
authority is based on talent proven over a period of years and the 
trust that it has generated. The dictatorship is therefore a 
meritocracy. 
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5. Linux Distributions 
Because the word “Linux” has differing meanings to different people, the 
term “Linux distribution” is used to bridge the gap between the stand-alone kernel 
and an entire packaged, fully functional Linux desktop or server operating 
system.  As of early 2008, the Linux advocacy site http://www.linux.org listed 220 
actively maintained distributions.  
While Linux kernel releases remain the domain of Linus Torvalds, 
distributions can be created and maintained by anyone.  Each Linux distribution, 
while maintaining some basic level of commonality with other distributions (if only 
due to kernel pedigree), brings something unique to its target user audience.  For 
example, Damn Small Linux (DSL) was stripped of a multitude of features found 
in most distributions in favor of delivering a very lightweight operating system 
with minimal system memory requirements.  It runs acceptably on old hardware 
and boots from removable media such as CDs and USB memory sticks.  The 
Backtrack distribution was created with computer system forensics in mind.  
Ubuntu, sponsored by the Canonical Corporation, has placed its emphasis on 
user-friendliness.  As a result, it has gained a significant user base over the past 
few years, rising to become the most popular distribution (in the last six months) 
on http://distrowatch.com, a popular Linux distribution-tracking website.  Finally, 
Red Hat Enterprise Linux, a fee-based product, has targeted the government and 
corporate markets, offering sophisticated directory server capabilities, a strict 
software testing and release methodology, and other features prized by 
organizations with a large number of managed client systems. 
B. CURRENT UNCLASSIFIED DESKTOP SYSTEMS 
1. Consolidated Acquisitions 
The Department of Defense has not mandated exclusive use of the 
Microsoft Windows operating system for unclassified desktop computing.  
Rather, following the civilian marketplace, the Services' networks have evolved to 
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use Microsoft's software as their primary unclassified desktop environments.  
Since the early part of this century, the Services have also taken it upon 
themselves to formally standardize their purchasing and configuration of 
Microsoft software.  This was done in part to reduce the costs associated with 
multiple smaller buys (leveraging volume licensing agreements) and inadvertent 
redundant license purchases across the enterprise.  The U.S. Army led the 
charge in Service-wide Microsoft Enterprise Licensing Agreements (ELAs) in 
2003, saying “the deal would save millions of dollars in operational costs and 
improve software license and asset management” (Wait, 2003).  Through its own 
recent 500 million dollar, six-year Microsoft ELA, the U.S. Air Force consolidated 
38 separate purchase agreements and projected expected savings of over 100 
million dollars.  In both cases, however, security was at least as important as cost 
in the ELA decision.  In fact, John Gilligan, U.S. Air Force Chief Information 
Officer at the time that Service's ELA was established, stated that “The major 
driver was probably security.”  The reasoning behind Gilligan's assertion is 
described in the following section. 
2. Standardized Configurations 
In 2006, to reap the security benefits of its new ELA, the U.S. Air Force 
worked directly with Microsoft to deploy a standardized version of the Windows 
XP desktop operating system, dubbed the Standard Desktop Configuration 
(SDC).  By means of very deliberate configuration control, this effort was “part of 
an overall objective to increase security and reduce lifecycle management costs 
associated with desktop computer systems” (Yasin, 2007).  The SDC includes 
not only the operating system, but also other elements considered essential to 
general productivity, systems management and security in the Air Force 
enterprise network (see Table 2).  At the end of 2007, the SDC was being 





Table 2.   U.S. Air Force SDC, November, 2007 
 Source:  U.S. Air Force 754th Electronic Systems Group 
 
The U.S. Air Force is not alone in its standardization efforts.  The Army 
produces a “Gold Master” and the U.S. Navy has its own “Workstation Baseline 
Software Configuration Gold Disk,” both of which are Service-specific versions of 
the SDC.  At the federal level, “The Office of Management and Budget requires 
all agencies to migrate to a standard desktop configuration for Microsoft 
Windows XP and Vista environments by February 2008” (Yasin, 2007).  These 
standardization efforts, while focused on the Microsoft Windows platform, do not 
demand Service-wide use of Microsoft products; they simply mandate a certain 
configuration when Microsoft products are used.  Similar security-based standard 
Application Manufacturer Version
Windows XP SP2 with Firewall Enabled Microsoft SP2
SMS 2003 Client Microsoft 2003
Norton Anti-Virus Symantec 10.0.2
.NET Framework SP2 Microsoft 1.1
ActivCard Gold Card Reader Software Activcard 3.0 FP1 USAF
Office 2003 Microsoft 2003
Visio 2003 Viewer Microsoft 2003
ICS Viewer PureEdge 6.0.1
MasterKey Plus (for DMS)    Boldon James 4.2.2
DoD Banner w/Screen Saver DoD 3.1
Internet Explorer                                      Microsoft 6.0.2900.2810
Acrobat Reader                                                       Adobe 7.0.7
Quicktime Player                                                    Apple 7.0.4
Windows Media Player Microsoft 10
Java Runtime Engine Sun 1.5
Macromedia Flash Player Plug-in Macromedia Latest
Shockwave Player Plug-In Macromedia Latest
MDAC Microsoft Latest
DoD PKI Certificates DoD
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configuration guidelines are also dictated by the Defense Information Systems 
Agency (DISA) for any Unix-like platforms, to include Linux. 
All of the standardization taking place in the Microsoft-based DoD 
networks actually simplifies the task of integrating Linux-based systems.  First, it 
provides a solid system architecture baseline with which any foreign hosts must 
interact.  Second, it establishes capability baselines; minimal functionality 
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III. OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE OPTIONS AND CAPABILITIES 
A. FUNCTIONAL COMPARISON 
1. Operating System 
The U.S. Air Force Standard Desktop Configuration offers a good starting 
point from which to evaluate potential OSS alternatives.  At the top of the list in 
Table 2, the operating system establishes the foundation for a comprehensive 
system configuration.  While there are several noteworthy OSS operating 
systems, including the mature Free BSD and Minix operating systems, DoD 
agencies are restricted by instructions and regulations as to which operating 
systems may be used on official, production networks.  This topic is addressed 
further in Chapter V of this document.   
 In short, as described by the U.S. Air Force Communications Agency in a 
telephone interview on April 25 2008, operating systems are only considered for 
use if they have been certified at Evaluated Assurance Level (EAL) 4+ in the 
National Information Assurance Partnership's (NIAP) Common Criteria 
Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS).  Additionally, certification testing for 
EAL 4+ must have taken place in a U.S. lab, per DoD Instruction 8500.2 and the 
NIAP's requirements for Common Criteria Testing Laboratories.  In the OSS 
world, this limits options to two vendors' Linux distributions.  As of the writing of 
this document, only Red Hat Enterprise Linux (various versions 4 and 5) and 
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server (version 10) had Common Criteria EAL 4+ from 
U.S. labs, according to the NIAP-CCEVS Validated Products List.  In the past 
year, Sun Microsystems has made strides in opening the source to its Solaris 
operating system, and version 10 has been awarded EAL 4+ (albeit from a 
Canadian lab).  However, the OpenSolaris project is not entirely the same as the 
Solaris operating system.  According to the http://OpenSolaris.org website, it is 
“an open source project sponsored by Sun Microsystems, Inc, that is initially 
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based on a subset of the source code for the Solaris Operating System... [It] will 
find a variety of uses, including being the basis for future versions of the Solaris 
OS product, other operating system projects, and third-party products and 
distributions.” 
 Primarily because of accessibility (in the form of a Naval Postgraduate 
School site license), the Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 Desktop distribution was 
informally evaluated for the purposes of this study.  In particular, it had to meet 
the author's needs as a general-purpose workstation, capable of using the same 
network resources and performing the same tasks as a similar Windows XP 
workstation.  In relation to these goals, the RHEL system performed well.  With 
its wired Ethernet connection to the Naval Postgraduate School's local area 
network, the system provided easy access to shared drives, intranet websites 
and printers.  Any necessary configuration was accomplished entirely in the 
point-and-click graphical user interface.   
2. Enterprise Management 
As noted next on the SDC list, Windows clients on many military 
installations are equipped with the Microsoft Systems Management Server (SMS) 
client-side application.  This application interfaces with an SMS server to allow 
for remote control, inventory, and other types of configuration management.  
While this particular piece of software is unique to the Microsoft Windows 
environment, RHEL offers similar tools that would be highly useful in remotely 
managing RHEL desktop systems.  The Red Hat Network web-based 
management system provides inventory capabilities for all registered systems 
and allows administrators to remotely deploy or remove software packages to 
and from specified groups of systems.  Enterprise-wide system management, 
while somewhat beyond the scope of this document, cannot be overlooked if a 




Since its inception, the Linux kernel has been far less affected by 
computer malware than the various Windows releases.  Whether or not this 
stems largely from the fact that the operating system is significantly less targeted 
by malware authors is a matter of debate.  The other side of this argument 
typically states that the massive peer review enjoyed by OSS gives it a much 
cleaner, robust code base, as well as a faster and more transparent correction 
mechanism for any discovered flaws.  According to one recent estimate, out of 
over 236,000 malware items, “only about 700 are meant for the various 
Unix/Linux distributions” (van Oers, 2007).   
 While many Linux users do not employ any anti-virus software 
whatsoever, DoD regulations stipulate otherwise.  The Defense Information 
Systems Agency (DISA) is responsible for establishing such policy Department-
wide (DISA STIG, 2006): 
Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 8500.1 establishes policy 
and assigns responsibilities to the Defense Information Systems 
Agency (DISA) to develop and provide security configuration 
guidance for IA and IA-enabled IT (Information Technology) 
products in coordination with the National Security Agency (NSA). 
Paragraph 4.18 of the 8500.1 states, "All IA and IA-enabled IT 
products incorporated into DOD information systems shall be 
configured in accordance with DOD-approved security configuration 
guidelines." DISA Field Security Operations (FSO) develops the 
guidelines, which are called Security Technical Implementation 
Guides.  . . . .  any UNIX based operating system in use in a DOD 
environment is subject to all relevant UNIX security requirements 
and must be capable of STIG compliance as verified by a Security 
Readiness Review (SRR). 
According to DISA's Unix STIG (a general document for Unix-related 
systems which also specifically applies to Linux) Security Readiness Review 
(SRR) Checklist, anti-virus software must be installed and set to scan the entire 
system automatically at weekly intervals.  While the U.S. Air Force SDC uses 
Norton (Symantec) Anti-Virus Corporate Edition, the STIG SRR refers to the 
McAffee command-line tool for Unix, and demands “an approved DoD virus scan 
 22
program” (DISA Unix SRR, p. 269).  Whether it is used to defend against the few 
known threats, or to prevent Windows malware from being propagated via the 
Linux systems, anti-virus software is a requirement for DoD Linux clients. 
4. Smart Card Middleware 
One increasingly important distinguishing feature of the RHEL 5 
distribution is its fully functional, out-of-the-box smart card support for many card 
readers.  Smart cards such as the DoD's Common Access Card (CAC) provide 
dual-factor authentication and encryption capabilities for more secure network 
log-ins and e-mail.  In addition to the usual open source command-line tools, Red 
Hat provides its own “Smart Card Manager” graphical system panel applet.  The 
combination of these programs negates the need for (and expense of) additional 
middleware, such as the ActivCard Gold software used on the Windows XP 
workstation.  This topic is covered more extensively in section B of this chapter, 
is it is quickly becoming essential to DoD computing.    
5. Productivity Suites 
With regards to office automation, OpenOffice.org (the name of an 
application, not just its website) has emerged as the predominant open source 
office productivity suite.  OpenOffice.org (known as OOo) is free of charge and 
comes with a word processor, as well as spreadsheet, presentation, schematic 
drawing and database programs.  While OOo has made great progress in terms 
of being able to read from and write to Microsoft Office file formats, the closed 
(and constantly changing) nature of those binary file formats has historically 
made interoperability a challenging prospect for OOo programmers.  Making the 
process easier was Microsoft's release of specifications on the Word, PowerPoint 
and Excel binary file formats in February of 2008 
(http://www.microsoft.com/interop/docs/officebinaryformats.mspx).  Currently, the 
OOo 2.4 word processor “Writer” can read from and write to Microsoft Office 
Word files from versions 6.0 to 2007.  In fact, Writer was used exclusively to 
compose and edit this document, which was originally based on a Microsoft 
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Word 2003 template.  Writer also has the built-in ability to export documents in 
the ubiquitous Portable Document Format (PDF); another requirement for final 
submission of this thesis.   
Weighing against OOo is its lack of full compatibility with Microsoft Office 
files, as that suite is the de facto standard throughout not only the DoD, but much 
of the business world.  While importing Office files is usually quite successful, 
irregularities and discrepancies sometimes surface.  OOo Draw, a Visio-like 
program, cannot open or save to Microsoft Visio files at all, and Word/Excel 
users who wish to use the OOo Writer/Calc programs will not be able to utilize 
any existing Word/Excel macros.  The Visio-related shortcomings of OOo are 
primarily related to importing and exporting native Visio files.  One work-around is 
to save Visio files in the Visio-XML format instead.  The OSS application Dia, by 
means of a plug-in, can then import, manipulate and export the files.  
Alternatively, users can switch to the more openly modifiable scalable vector 
graphics (SVG) format, which can be manipulated by a number of OSS 
applications, including Dia and OOo Draw.  
Although these limitations will probably be of limited impact to the average 
office staff, they will undoubtedly cause some level of frustration among “power 
users.”  To further assist in making a comprehensive comparison, Idealware, a 
nonprofit software review organization, has published a fairly thorough feature 
review comparing Microsoft Office and OOo at 
http://www.idealware.org/articles/msoffice_vs_openoffice.php.  In addition to the 
features previously mentioned, Idealware notes that OOo Writer does not contain 
a grammar checker, whereas Word 2003 does.  A comparatively rudimentary 
checker called LanguageTool is available for Writer as a user-installable, third-
party extension. 
The OpenOffice.org developers do not pride themselves exclusively on 
compatibility with Microsoft file formats, and this cannot be the sole measure of 
the quality of the suite.  In particular, OOo developers and users are generally 
pleased to report that they have the native ability to work with Open Document 
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(ODF) files; an International Standards Organization approved, royalty and 
license-free format.  According to http://opendocument.xml.org/overview: 
From a technical point of view, ODF is a ZIP archive that contains a 
collection of different XML files as well as binary files like 
embedded images. The use of XML makes accessing the 
document content simple because content can be opened and 
changed with simple text editors if necessary. In contrast, the 
previously used binary file formats were cryptic and difficult to 
process. The ZIP compression guarantees relatively small file 
sizes, in order to reduce file storage and transmission bandwidth 
requirements. 
 As of late spring 2008, the average price of the Microsoft Office 2003 
Professional suite was $425 for a single-user retail license.  Office is not natively 
available for use on any Linux-based platform.  Conversely, the OpenOffice.org 
suite is available as a free download for the Windows, Linux and Mac OSX 
operating systems, and is included with many Linux distributions, including Red 
Hat Enterprise Linux.  As with all other enterprise software, a decision to employ 
a certain office productivity suite cannot be based solely on initial acquisition 
price, no matter how low.  Product capabilities, as well as the significant other 
OSS advantages and challenges listed throughout this document, must factor 
into the decision. 
 The eighth item on the SDC list is the ICS Viewer.  Both the U.S. Army 
and U.S. Air Force have used various incarnations of this software to edit 
electronic forms instead of paper records; thousands of forms have been 
converted to its Extensible Markup Language (XML) format.  This process is vital 
to meeting goals of the paperless office initiatives mandated by the Government 
Paperwork Elimination Act of 1998.  The PureEdge application itself has gone 
through several substantial changes in the past few years.  Most significantly, the 
developer, PureEdge, was acquired by IBM in 2005, and the product was 
renamed IBM Workplace Forms.  More recently, IBM transitioned the application 
into its Lotus suite, and it is now known as IBM Lotus Forms.   
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Across much of the U.S. Army and in parts of the U.S. Air Force, digital 
signature software by vendor Silanis is used in conjunction with the PureEdge 
and/or IBM form software to enable Common Access Card-based signatures, 
further reducing the need for paperwork.  This process is, in most cases, entirely 
dependent on Windows-specific client-side software.  However, the capability 
now exists to host the electronic forms on a web server and allow users to edit 
them in a web browser.  According to an IBM press release about Lotus Forms 
3.0, “Businesses and government organizations may now deliver core business 
processes to their customers or constituents via the Internet and enable forms 
completion — including digital signature capabilities — without concern for 
managing the software levels on the consumer's computer” (IBM, 2007).  This 
capability may bring operating system independence to yet one more application, 
and enable digital forms on the Linux desktop. 
6. E-mail 
While Microsoft Office includes the Outlook e-mail and groupware client, 
OpenOffice.org does not provide any similar functionality, perhaps because 
several other independent (and already popular) products exist in the OSS 
community.  Replicating Outlook-based e-mail functionality, however, may be the 
biggest obstacle to integrating general-purpose Linux workstations into any DoD 
Windows-dominated network.  Most military installations rely on Microsoft 
Exchange for e-mail and groupware services.  While an Exchange server is 
capable of providing mail services to clients via the industry-standard Post Office 
Protocol (POP) or Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP), these capabilities 
have historically been disabled for security and supportability purposes.  In 
addition, their use robs clients of most of the groupware functionality offered by 
the Exchange server, such as shared calendars, tasks, and other collaborative 
features.  Therefore, most military installations only permit e-mail clients to 
connect to Exchange servers via Exchange's native, proprietary Message 
Application Programming Interface (MAPI).  
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 Without the use of third-party middleware, no OSS e-mail client can 
connect to an Exchange server in MAPI mode.  However, middleware known as 
Brutus (http://www.42tools.com) now exists to enable Novell Evolution e-mail 
client (and potentially others) to take full advantage of Exchange functionality.  
While employing this middleware server would theoretically be independent of 
the operation of the Exchange server, it still goes beyond simple addition of OSS-
based desktop software and is therefore beyond the scope of this document.  
Currently, the simplest remedy to the OSS-Exchange barrier is the use of the 
Evolution e-mail client, with Outlook Web Access (OWA) enabled on the 
Exchange server.  OWA need not be permitted to communicate outside the 
intranet (something that is often blocked due to security concerns); it simply 
serves as the communications channel for internal Evolution clients.  When 
operated in “Exchange mode” (using OWA), the Evolution client provides both a 
look-and-feel and functionality that is very similar to that of Outlook.  It can 
access the Exchange Global Address List and integrate with DoD Public Key 
Infrastructure, allowing users to send and receive digitally signed and encrypted 
e-mails (see Appendix A). 
 In addition to the closed communications protocol, Outlook and Exchange 
also employ a proprietary “personal folders” file format (.pst) that is not usable by 
OSS e-mail clients.  This fact makes it difficult for users to fully access their email 
accounts, particularly stored e-mail, from disparate client platforms.  The problem 
is not unique to OSS e-mail clients.  Many network users in the U.S. Central 
Command (USCENTCOM) headquarters use Blackberry communication 
devices, which also cannot access .pst files.  The solution at USCENTCOM is to 
avoid the use of .pst files altogether.  Rather than giving users a large network 
storage home drive on which to store their .pst's, administrators allocate the 
space directly to Exchange mailboxes.  This technique can also allow Evolution 
and other OSS e-mail client users to access all their mail from anywhere on the 
corporate local area network. 
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The final challenge facing OSS e-mail clients is the Defense Message 
System (DMS), a DoD-wide system of record for official message traffic, and the 
replacement for the Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN).  DMS is based on 
x.509 certificates and hardware tokens called Fortezza cards, but was designed 
exclusively around a Microsoft Exchange/Outlook architecture and a specialized 
directory tree.  None of the required extension software is available for OSS e-
mail clients or the Linux environment.  Fortunately, DMS is not required for use 
by all DoD members, and sees the most use in classified networks.  Additionally, 
according to the Defense Information Systems Agency's website, “DMS will 
continue to shift from a predominantly writer-to-reader topology to a domain 
Fortezza topology” (http://www.disa.mil/main/prodsol/dms.html).  Software known 
as the Collaborative Messaging System (CMS) by Lockheed Martin, Boldon 
James and Microsoft, already exists to address this shift.  It allows DMS access 
via a web browser, with hardware tokens being located at central server, a 
solution that may extend DMS functionality to non-Windows clients. 
7. Other Third-party Viewers 
The U.S. Air Force SDC includes the ability to play Apple Quicktime, 
Adobe Flash and Windows Media files and streams.  This functionality is freely 
available on multiple Linux distributions, usually in the form of both open and 
closed-source solutions.  The Java Runtime Engine (JRE) is available for Linux 
from both Sun and IBM.  Acrobat Reader is available from Adobe, and several 
other OSS programs including OpenOffice.org allow for reading from and writing 
to PDF files. 
8. Substitutions/Equivalents Overview 
As described in the last seven sections, OSS offers an array of products to 
address every basic need of typical office automation computing.  An overview of 
the potential alternatives to SDC applications can be found in Table 3 below.   
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Table 3.   List of SDC/OSS Equivalents/Substitutions 
 
Some of the items listed in Table 3 are not available in the default 
installation of RHEL.  However, RHEL and most other major Linux distributions 
provide access to upgrades, bug fixes and additional software packages through 
an online repository system.  Systems can be set up to either automatically fetch 
and install updates, or users can retrieve additions manually via a search 
function.  This capability can be exploited to address specific Service software 
requirements.  Software installation tools such as yum can be pointed at several 
different repositories simultaneously.  A Service would simply need to establish 
its own internal repository servers, populated with all required applications (either 
Current SDC Software OSS Equivalent/Substitution
Windows XP SP2 with Firewall Enabled Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.x
SMS 2003 Client N/A
Norton Anti-Virus McAffee Anti-Virus, Clam, etc.
.NET Framework SP2 N/A
ActivCard Gold Card Reader Software N/A
Office 2003 OpenOffice.org 2.x
Visio 2003 Viewer Dia
ICS Viewer Possible Wine implementation
MasterKey Plus (for DMS)    N/A
DoD Banner w/Screen Saver DoD Banner w/Screen Saver
Internet Explorer                                      Firefox
Acrobat Reader                                                       Acrobat Reader or OSS variant
Quicktime Player                                                    Totem or other OSS equivalent
Windows Media Player Totem or other OSS equivalent
Java Runtime Engine Java Runtime Engine
Macromedia Flash Player Plug-in Adobe Flash Plug-in
Shockwave Player Plug-In Adobe Flash Plug-in
MDAC N/A
DoD PKI Certificates DoD PKI Certificates
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proprietary or other perhaps modified/vetted OSS) to simplify installation and 
maintenance of applications that are not included on standard distributions. 
B. PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE AND COMMON ACCESS CARD 
1. Overview and Regulations 
The Common Access Card (CAC), with its embedded Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) certificates, is quickly becoming the primary authentication 
instrument for U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) information systems.  While 
some internal LAN systems may still be accessed via username and password, 
initial login to the NIPRNet (Unclassified but Sensitive Internet Protocol [IP] 
Router Network) must now be accomplished via two-factor authentication.  This 
radical security shift became effective across the DoD as of August 2006, 
according to Joint Task Force – Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO) 
Computer Tasking Order (CTO) 06-02.  Unless otherwise approved by JTF-
GNO, the required “two-factors” are the CAC and Personal Identification Number 
(PIN).  Although some Internet-facing DoD web servers may (and do) still 
operate with username and password combinations, this practice is fading.  Web 
resources such as the Air Force Portal and Army Knowledge Online accept the 
CAC and PIN as their primary means of authentication. 
The CAC PKI system is also perfectly suited to email use, and almost all 
CAC-holders have the option to send and receive signed and/or encrypted email 
messages to and from other CAC users in the DoD PKI sphere.  However, all of 
this functionality demands that the users' computer system be able to interface 
with the CAC, access the embedded key material and use the proper associated 
cryptography to perform secure transactions with remote machines. 
2. Technical Issues 
For DoD users working with any of the recent Microsoft Windows 
operating systems, CAC tools and documentation are readily available and are 
distributed by the Services, making client-side connectivity a fairly simple 
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process.  Mac OS X is becoming more readily supported; in 2006 the U.S. Army 
added Thrusby's ADmitMac for CAC software to its official enterprise software 
list.  Linux users are still left largely to fend for themselves, although this situation 
is slowly changing.  At the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), for 
example, the Open Source Steering Group (OSSG) exists to tackle some of the 
basic issues regarding the convergence of Linux, CAC and PKI technologies.  
And as smart cards are used internationally for personal banking, government 
and corporate identity management, the OSS community has already devoted 
much effort to the cause of Linux-based smart card functionality.   
 The primary caveat to Linux interoperability is that CAC readers must be 
compliant with the PC/SC specification, which has become the de facto, cross-
platform industry standard for smart card compatibility design.  Compliance with 
PC/SC is also mandated by the Defense Manpower Data Center for all card 
readers used by the DoD.  To operate in the Linux environment, the card reader 
must have Linux driver support.  This can come in the form of a proprietary driver 
from the vendor, or compatibility with the free, open source USB CCID driver, 
courtesy of the Movement for the Use of Smart Cards in a Linux Environment 
(MUSCLE) project.  From the http://musclecard.com website, “MUSCLE is a 
project to coordinate the development of smart cards and applications under 
Linux. The purpose is to develop a set of compliant drivers, API's, and a resource 
manager for various smart cards and readers for the GNU environment.”  The 
project's PC/SC Lite middleware has also become ubiquitous in the Linux world 
as a means of allowing applications to communicate with smart card readers.  
One of the best resources for determining a card reader's Linux  
compatibility is the MUSCLE project's USB CCID site, at 
http://pcsclite.alioth.debian.org/ccid.html, which contains names and photographs 
of many devices. 
 According to the OpenSC project (http://www.opensc-
project.org/opensc/wiki/OverView), one needs the following software tools to 
make use of a smart card: an application, a library, middleware and a driver.  The 
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application might be a web browser like Firefox or an email client like Novell 
Evolution.  As previously discussed, the middleware and drivers can be provided 
by the MUSCLE project's PC/SC and USB CCID tools, respectively.  Finally, the 
library used in Linux is known as PKCS (Public Key Cryptographic Standards) 
#11, or the Cyrptoki Application Programming Interface (API), and is part of the 
Mozilla foundation's Network Security Services (NSS).  The two free, open 
source PKCS#11 provider libraries are OpenSC and Coolkey.  As a point of 
reference, the comparable Microsoft library is Crypto API.  These libraries allow 
applications to interface with smart card tokens without having detailed 
knowledge about the card or reader hardware.  Additionally, as NSS is Federal 
Information Processing Standard 140-2 validated, it meets requirements for 
unclassified cryptographic modules used by the U.S. Federal Government. 
 For the purposes of this study, RHEL 5.1 Desktop operating system was 
used in conjunction with its bundled Mozilla Firefox 1.5 web browser and Novell 
Evolution 2.x e-mail client.  Further technical information on the procedures used 
to set up these clients for use with the CAC can be found in Appendix A of this 
document.  In short, by copying the Mozilla Network Security Services (NSS) 
modules provided by OSSG to the appropriate directories on the client machine, 
all DoD Root Certificate Authority information is loaded to the client software, and 
the proper PCKS#11 libraries are installed as well.  By completing this relatively 
simple task, users can access CAC-enabled websites with Firefox, and send and 
receive digitally signed and encrypted e-mail with Evolution.  It should be noted 
that users will still need the public keys of e-mail recipients in order to send 
encrypted email.  An enterprise-wide listing of all available recipients' keys is 
available at the DISA Global Directory Service (https://dod411.gds.disa.mil), 
where keys can be downloaded, then easily imported into any email client of 
choice.  Finally, once the NSS modules are properly loaded into the system, 
OpenOffice.org can also take advantage of them to digitally sign documents 
(saved in Open Document format) using the CAC. 
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C. OTHER SECURITY BENEFITS AND CONCERNS 
1. Vulnerability and Exploit Overview 
Introducing a number of Linux-based workstations with various OSS 
applications into an otherwise homogeneous Windows network brings the added 
benefit of malware tolerance.  Just as diversified crops are less susceptible to a 
strain of blight, employing a heterogeneous mix of operating systems and 
applications imparts a significantly greater level of virus, trojan and worm 
resistance to a corporate network.  OSS systems have also historically shipped 
with default configurations that are inherently more secure than those of their 
Microsoft counterparts, providing less open ports and services for potential 
exploits, and giving users less system-wide privileges by default.  Finally, 
developers of many popular OSS packages have proven adept at releasing 
vulnerability fixes before exploits are widely available. 
Based on the evidence available at this point, however, one cannot 
objectively state that OSS is or is not inherently more or less secure than its 
closed source equivalents.  The “many eyeballs” theory asserts that, since more 
people are examining the source code, flaws will be more readily discovered and 
fixed.  The counter-argument says that attackers also have access to the same 
code, simplifying their task of finding faults and exploiting them first.  Additionally, 
the “many eyeballs” of code reviewers may more likely be looking for functionality 
bugs than security holes.  
In August of 2007, Jack Germain of the LinuxInsider technology website 
published a two-part story comparing the current state of open- and closed-
source web browser security.  His work focused on zero-day browser exploits: 
those attack vectors which take advantage of vulnerabilities that were previously 
unknown to system owners, defenders and the user community at large.  These 
chinks in the software armor, instead of being exploited immediately, are 
sometimes bought and sold on the malware black market, and are capable of 
fetching tens and perhaps hundreds of thousands of dollars per exploit (Miller, 
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2007).   According to Germain's research, “Vulnerability management solutions 
firm PatchLink sought a closer view of its customers' concerns over browser 
security issues in a recent survey.  Responses from 250 customers revealed that 
the No. 1 security concern was zero-day vulnerabilities, Paul Zimski, director of 
product and market strategy at PatchLink, told LinuxInsider.”   
 Germain rather understandably did not reach a conclusion or proffer an 
opinion on which type of software (OSS or closed-source) was more secure.  But 
due to the target-specific nature of zero-day exploits and the fact that they are so 
difficult to defend against, the only sure-fire countermeasure is to employ a 
heterogeneous mix of systems, ensuring that at least some network hosts are 
impervious to the attack.  This kind of thinking should resonate with DoD network 
security managers as part of a “defense in depth” strategy, as the Department 
cannot afford to lose complete network functionality due to the sudden 
appearance of one zero-day exploit. 
2. Transparency and Backdoors 
While neither OSS nor closed-source software may ever be free of 
inadvertent coding-error-related vulnerabilities, only OSS offers the transparency 
necessary to instill confidence that the software has no intentional backdoors.  
Whether software vendors include backdoors for simplified system maintenance 
or for more nefarious purposes, they may eventually be discovered and exploited 
by interested third parties.  A more benign example of this type of programming 
is known as the “easter egg.”  Famous examples include the simple flight 
simulator and car racing games found in older versions of Microsoft Excel.  
These sub-programs, unrelated to the title application, can be accessed by 
performing a secret series of key presses and mouse clicks.  The games are not 
harmful to the system (other than unnecessarily using up system storage space), 
but serve to illustrate how simple it can be to hide code within a closed source 
program. 
 Making this scenario more disconcerting is the rampant subcontracting 
and off-shoring witnessed in today's software development environment.  While a 
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primary vendor may have the best intentions, subcontracted code modules, 
inadequately vetted, can introduce significant security risks.  This should be of 
particular concern to any DoD agency; as the off-shoring trend is unlikely to be 
reversed, it must be factored into software security policies and strategies. 
 In certain conditions and to certain customers, Microsoft makes the source 
code for its Windows operating system and Office productivity suite available 
under the Shared Source Initiative.  However laudable, this offering has several 
shortcomings that keep it from being truly open.  First, only select users can 
obtain the source code for review.  For example, certain governments may view 
the Windows code base under the Government Security Program (GSP).  Code 
access is tightly restricted via smart card authentication.  This limited release 
significantly reduces the “many eyeballs” type of security enjoyed by fully open 
source software.  Additionally, the code is available for review, but may not be 
modified in any way (to meet specific needs or fix bugs, for example).  Finally, 
reviewers may not compile the code into binary form, which would otherwise let 
them produce executable versions of the programs in question, identical to those 
delivered by the vendor.  Without questioning the integrity of Microsoft's 
programmers, it is worth mentioning here that the entire development chain, 
including the source code of the compiler program, must be open to scrutiny to 
assure trust in the open source system.   
 In the strictest sense, though, even this is not enough.  Unix programmer 
Ken Thompson brought this lesson to light in his 1983 Turing Award Lecture 
Reflections on Trusting Trust.  In this famous treatise, he described a means of 
propagating a self-replicating trojan by slipping malicious code into the compiler 
program.  Whenever the compiler was used to compile its own original source, 
the trojan was inserted into the new compiler binary.  Thus, the source code of 
the compiler could pass muster under examination, even though it too would 
become a tainted binary once compiled.  This type of attack might be defeated 
with the “Diverse Double-Compiling” (DDC) check, a method detailed by David A 
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Wheeler, but only if the reviewer has access to two independent compilers and 
their respective source code.  As Wheeler puts it: 
. . . there’s a catch: the DDC defense only works if you can get the 
source code for your software creation tools, including the 
operating system, compiler, and so on. That kind of information is 
typically only available for OSS/FS programs! Thus, even in the 
case of the dangerous “trusting trust” attack, OSS/FS has a security 
advantage (Wheeler, 2007). 
3. Department of Homeland Security Code Scan 
Although it is a minority opinion, detractors have contended that OSS is 
unfit for government and military service because we cannot know who is 
contributing to the source code (Wolfe, 2004).  This argument would only hold 
water if OSS were instead “closed source with random public contribution” 
software.  Fortunately, it is not.  Contributions are not blindly added to mainline 
releases, but are scrutinized by application and kernel owners and any number of 
interested third parties (perhaps to include the utilizing agencies themselves) 
before they are published.  After the new code has been publicly released (if it 
has even been released in binary form; much OSS is released in source-only 
form), the source code is still permanently available for examination by any 
curious individuals.  Additionally, most prominent OSS projects manage code 
contributions with some variant of the Concurrent Version System (CVS).  These 
systems track contributions as an inherent part of their functionality, making 
unnoticed malicious changes even less likely. 
Claims of intentional coding malice aside, OSS is as susceptible to human 
error as any other software, even with its more open peer review.  Whereas 
proprietary software vendors might pay to have mission-critical code scrutinized 
by third party firms and tools, OSS developers have had, in some cases, neither 
the resources nor the motivation to do the same.  However, several prominent 
OSS packages have become a vital part of the Internet as we know it; calling 
them “mission-critical” to the daily business of the nation is not an exaggeration.  
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In 2006, the Department of Homeland Security recognized this fact and awarded 
a research grant to Stanford University, Symantec Corporation and Coverity, a 
company that specializes in software development.  The aim of the 1.2 million 
dollar, three-year project was static analysis of the source code of 40 of the most 
prominent OSS packages using Coverity's Prevent software package.  Results 
are provided to the OSS software maintainers so that bugs can be quickly 
corrected.  As of the writing of this document, the http://scan.coverity.com project 
website claims that almost 8,000 bugs have been fixed since early 2006. 
D. BOOTABLE “LIVE” OPERATING SYSTEMS 
Several Linux distributions are released (or modified by third parties) so 
that the entire operating system can be run from the installation media, be it CD, 
DVD, USB memory, or other type of digital storage.  No files are installed to the 
host computer’s hard drive; the entire system is loaded to and run from Random 
Access Memory (RAM).  Known as Live CD's, these distributions present an 
interesting option for easily-revised, quickly distributed, complete bundled 
operating environments.  They may be a perfect solution for remote/mobile 
classified computing, where a user boots the CD and establishes an encrypted 
session with a remote classified server.  When finished working, he or she then 
removes the CD and simply reboots the laptop, leaving no classified material on 
that machine.  The client system need not even be fitted with a hard drive, to 
ensure that no trace of classified data exists when the system is powered-down. 
As an aside, Live CD's present an excellent opportunity for both 
administrators and users to gain familiarity with OSS operating systems and 
applications without disturbing existing Windows installations.  Users could even 
be given a Live CD of the enterprise's standard OSS desktop configuration to test 
and use at home in a risk-free manner. 
E. APPLICATION AND CODE RE-USE 
One intangible benefit of OSS is its potential for re-use throughout related 
communities of interest.  Many government agencies perform similar functions, 
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only at different levels or across different geographic regions.  Instead of 
spending millions of dollars to procure the same tools over and over again, these 
agencies might take advantage of OSS code that has already been developed or 
modified by another agency for the same purpose.  The National Center for Open 
Source Policy and Research has, through a site called 
http://GovernmentForge.org, laid the groundwork for this kind of e-government 
OSS re-use in the civilian public sector.  In the DoD, areas of potential overlap 
include personnel and finance systems, crew scheduling databases, 
maintenance record databases and more general-purpose computing tools such 
as web portals and office automation systems.  These software needs are not 
unique to any one unit, command, or service, so why should these entities work 
independently to purchase or develop overlapping solutions?  To sweeten the 
deal, most citizens may be pleasantly surprised to find that a number of their 
government’s OSS development expenditures and contributions could be made 
available for use by the public at large.  Such was the case with the National 
Security Agency’s work on a Mandatory Access Control version of the Linux 
kernel, released to the public as Security Enhanced Linux (SE Linux).  SE Linux 
code is now present in many popular Linux distributions, to include RHEL. 
 Shared libraries have long been used in the programming world to help 
reduce duplication of effort.  The OSS community has taken this concept to a 
macro-level to develop means of dealing with unique, nuanced requirements that 
intrude on an otherwise shared purpose.  Instead of developing custom-built 
solutions for each requirement, a modular framework is first established around a 
common core.  Plug-ins or modules are then written to address specific needs.  
This paradigm can be witnessed in action in the Apache web server and the 
Linux Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) frameworks.  Especially where 
this modular framework is concerned, the potential benefits of such code re-use 
are even more apparent.   
Standardization and reusable components have historically been key to 
moving hitherto artisan practices into the streamlined, efficient world of 
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industrialization.  In software development, rapid standardization has been 
realized by means of open communication via the Internet.  OSS and open 
standards themselves have seen growth and innovation that would likely not 
have been possible in numerous smaller, sequestered work environments.  And 
OSS has been able to progress at its current pace largely due to the availability 
of quality, reusable, interchangeable components.  Such collaborative potential is 
a significant factor that must be tied back into TCO for use in a “best value” 
procurement decision. 
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IV. POTENTIAL OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE CHALLENGES 
A. REGULATIONS GOVERNING SOFTWARE USE 
1. Information Assurance 
Although DoD computer systems are not limited to running one particular 
operating system from any one vendor, each of the Services must observe 
regulations which restrict the information systems software and hardware that 
may be attached to the DoD's official networks.  As described briefly in Chapter 
III of this document, DoD-level doctrine exists to establish technical definitions 
and Department-wide standards for the use of networked operating systems, 
which fall under the category of Information Assurance (IA) or IA-enabled 
Information Technology (IT) products.  According to DoD Directive 8500.01 (p. 
18, section E2.1.21), IA-enabled IT is a “product or technology whose primary 
role is not security, but which provides security services as an associated feature 
of its intended operating capabilities.  Examples include such products as 
security-enabled web browsers, screening routers, trusted operating systems, 
and security-enabled messaging systems”. 
 DoD Directive 8500.01 then mandates that all IA-enabled IT products 
must “comply with the evaluation and validation requirements of National 
Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Policy Number 
11” (NSTISSP-11).  That document, now maintained by the Committee on 
National Security Systems (CNSS), specifies that “the acquisition of COTS IA 
and IA-enabled IT products (to be used on systems entering, processing, storing, 
displaying, or transmitting national security information) . . . shall be limited only 
to those which have been evaluated and validated in accordance with the criteria, 
schemes, or programs specified . . .”  Those programs are listed below: 
z The International Common Criteria for Information Security Technology 
Evaluation Mutual Recognition Arrangement (CCRA).  The CCRA is a 
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mechanism by which international member government agencies can take 
advantage of evaluations that were performed in different countries.  While 
useful, the CCRA limits internationally recognized evaluations to EAL 4. 
z The National Security Agency (NSA) / National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) 
Evaluation and Validation Program.  The NIAP Evaluation and Validation 
Program is the Common Criteria process in the United States.  
z The NIST Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) validation 
program.  The FIPS validation program is required for any technology that 
provides cryptography for United States government information systems.   
 Where cryptography is concerned, it is important to note that an entire 
system does not need FIPS certification, only the cryptographic modules it uses.  
In the case of desktop software, this usually boils down to the components that 
handle digital signature and encryption.  For many Linux systems, Secure 
Sockets Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS), perhaps the most 
commonly-used cryptography standards on the Internet, are provided by the 
OpenSSL libraries.  The Mozilla Firefox web browser, Thunderbird e-mail client, 
OpenOffice.org, and other applications use the Network Security Services (NSS) 
libraries, which provide SSL, TLS and various Public Key Cryptography 
Standards (PKCS).  PKCS implementations bring digital signature, encryption 
and smart card capabilities to any program written to take advantage of the 
PKCS libraries.  Both NSS and OpenSSL are FIPS 140-2 certified. 
 All of these rigid regulations governing software use in the DoD can 
significantly complicate the process of integrating any typical proprietary software 
into a DoD network, and this applies to OSS as well.  While the rules help to 
provide a secure, standardized baseline for information technology products on 
the Global Information Grid, they also serve as barriers to entry for smaller 
software projects.  Common Criteria and FIPS validation can cost from tens to 
hundreds of thousands of dollars and take years to achieve (GAO, 2006, p. 19).  
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The time factor can keep otherwise mature products out of federal institutions, 
and is also directly at odds with the rapid development models used by most 
software development, and especially OSS projects.  “This disconnect between 
industry and NIAP has resulted in an awkward evaluation process that ensures 
that security products are well into their life cycles, if not obsolete, by the time 
they can be evaluated, vendors say” (Jackson, 2007). 
 The financial factor is an obvious barrier to entry for any community-
maintained software suite.  In the OSS world, this has sometimes been 
overcome by either direct sponsorship from a utilizing agency, or third party 
support from an interested vendor.  In the case of OpenSSL, the U.S. Defense 
Medical Logistics Standard Support (DMLSS) spearheaded the initiative to obtain 
FIPS 140-2 validation.  According to comments from Debora Bonner, Director of 
Operations at DMLSS (http://www.linuxdevices.com/news/NS4742716157.html), 
The DMLSS program is heavily dependent on OpenSSL based 
cryptography, so this validation will save us hundreds of thousands 
of dollars," Bonner added. "Multiple commercial and government 
entities, including Medical Health Systems (MHS), have been 
counting on this validation to avoid massive software licensing 
expenditures. The three year validation process was an ordeal, but 
our persistence finally paid off. 
As a result of this one effort by DMLSS and others, numerous government 
agencies are now able to legally employ free OpenSSL cryptography in federal 
programs. 
2. Licensing  
The Open Source Institute lists several dozen “open” software licenses 
(http://www.opensource.org/licenses/category).  Of these, nine are categorized 
as popular or widely used.  Among these nine, the most prevalent in the OSS 
community is the GNU General Public License (GPL).  The GPL has been 
termed a “viral” software license, in that derivative works must also be licensed 
under the GPL, which serves to maintain the open source process.  Additionally, 
there has been some concern that GPL-licensed products might not be suitable 
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for government use and modification, since any publicly released, derived 
programs must have their source code made available as well.  This may be a 
valid concern in some cases.  In the case of generic, non-sensitive programs, 
releasing source code fixes and/or modifications would serve to benefit the 
original program and perhaps the nation at large.  However, for sensitive 
projects, the resulting binary programs should not be made publicly available 
anyway, and therefore the modified source would not be an issue of concern, 
either.  This all hinges on whether or not the GPL-derived, modified code remains 
within the organization.  Per the http://www.GNU.org Frequently Asked 
Questions page, 
The GPL does not require you to release your modified version, or 
any part of it. You are free to make modifications and use them 
privately, without ever releasing them. This applies to organizations 
(including companies), too; an organization can make a modified 
version and use it internally without ever releasing it outside the 
organization. 
 Finally, it should be noted that OSS licensed under the GPL (or similar 
licensing for software meeting the Open Source Initiative's definition) is not public 
domain freeware/shareware, specifically because of its unique licensing.  
However, DoD Directive 8500.01 (p. 6, Section 4.19) makes an interesting (if 
unfortunate) link between public domain software (freeware) and products with 
limited or no warranty:    
Public domain software products, and other software products with 
limited or no warranty, such as those commonly known as freeware 
or shareware, shall only be used in DoD information systems to 
meet compelling operational requirements. Such products shall be 
thoroughly assessed for risk and accepted for use by the 
responsible DAA [Designated Approving Authority]. 
This excerpt from DoDD 8500.01, while well intentioned, places perhaps 
undue emphasis on warranty, and may dissuade the use of OSS in some cases 
where it is the best option.  Many pieces of OSS are offered with limited or no 
warranty.  This includes software distributed under the GNU General Public 
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License, and most other popular OSS licenses.  By comparison, many popular 
pieces of proprietary software are offered with either no warranty (and, in fact, 
vendor indemnification clauses), or very little warranty.   For example, the 
Microsoft XP End User License Agreement (EULA) offers a limited, 90-day 
warranty against defects, but the warranty does not extend to service  
packs or other hot fixes applied after the initial 90-day period 
(http://www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/sp2/proeula.mspx).  Additionally, the EULA 
specifies that users are not entitled to any damages whatsoever if the software in 
any way fails to perform as expected.  Therefore, Windows XP is delivered with a 
warranty, but most of it seems to serve the vendor more than the user.  Again, 
this only serves to highlight the perhaps negative (and questionable) link 
between free software and warranty in DoDD 8500.01. 
3. Further Intellectual Property Issues 
In 2003, the SCO Group sued IBM and threatened Linux users around the 
world, stating that they (SCO) owned the Unix copyright, and that Linux was 
infringing on this copyright by illegally using Unix code.  To date, these 
allegations have not been publicly proven.  However, several large ISV's, to 
include Red Hat, HP and Novell, have offered their Linux customers 
indemnification against any potential copyright or patent infringement lawsuits.  
The Red Hat Open Assurance program, for example, also includes 
replacing/modifying any potentially infringing code, or obtaining the rights for a 
customer to continue using the code legally, should such an issue arise.  It now 
appears unlikely that users of Linux code will face such copyright infringement 
concerns (the SCO Group filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in late 
2007), but the stated protections offered by large Linux systems vendors may 
remain valuable to potential government customers. 
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B. COMMUNITY-SPECIFIC SOFTWARE NEEDS 
1. Open Source Software Modification  
Numerous OSS applications have reached levels of capability and 
maturity that have already made them dominant tools for their respective jobs.  
Examples include the Apache web server, MySQL database, Sendmail e-mail 
server, BIND Domain Name System and Linux operating system (at least in a 
server capacity).  Still, OSS chosen for use by DoD agencies may require 
modifications beyond what the standard commercial packages offer.  And while it 
is true that the availability of source code makes OSS inherently more adaptable 
than closed-source software, there are costs involved in taking advantage of this 
benefit beyond the price of hiring programmers to modify the code.  Most notably, 
interested entities must deal with the dilemma of forking, which occurs when a 
modified piece of code is not reintroduced into the “mainline” software 
distribution.  Instead, the mainline code authors continue along their original path, 
making modifications and releases independent (perhaps even unaware) of the 
forked product.  As a result, the agency which has forked the code in its own 
direction may be incapable of taking advantage of subsequent mainline 
advances such as bug-fixes, security patches and other feature updates.  An 
eventual solution to these concerns may be a series of Government Off-the-Shelf 
(GOTS) OSS products with COTS roots.   
An example, albeit a vastly simplified one, can be found in Scientific Linux.  
This Linux distribution was created by the Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory 
and the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN).  The distribution’s 
creators have taken the publicly available source code of Red Hat Enterprise 
Linux, compiled it, and made several additions and changes to suit their own 
needs.  However, they state very clearly that their distribution will always be 
binary-compatible with the corresponding Red Hat release.  In this way, any 
software compiled for Red Hat systems can also be seamlessly run on Scientific 
Linux.  It is a simple logical step to apply this concept to the DoD’s needs.  Each 
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branch of service (and/or major command within that service) could have its own 
distribution, populated with special-purpose programs, public key certificates, and 
even document libraries that meet that community's needs.  Updates would be 
centrally controlled, undergoing testing for security vulnerabilities and other flaws, 
but essentially keeping in line with open source community releases. 
2. Porting and Application Compatibility 
When an acquisition authority considers supplanting existing, familiar 
systems with new OSS alternatives, he or she must determine and weigh all the 
support-related costs of migrating existing capabilities to the new systems.  In 
some cases, this may be done with little turmoil if users can accomplish the same 
tasks natively in the new environment.  However, where legacy applications are 
in heavy use and have no apparent equivalent on the new OSS platform, they 
may have to be ported to the new architecture to enable continued productivity.  
In short, porting typically entails significant software development; rewriting the 
code that was intended to run on one platform so that it can be natively executed 
on another platform.  This can have a considerable negative impact on both cost 
and schedule and may even be detrimental to performance depending on the 
quality of the code re-engineering.   
To tackle the challenge of migrating Windows applications to the Linux-
based desktop, one alternative to porting is use of the Wine (Wine Is Not an 
Emulator) environment.  As its name implies (and its developers are keen to 
point out), Wine is, in fact, a Windows application compatibility layer, not an 
emulator.  It translates Windows instructions into those understood by Linux, 
allowing users to install and use many (though not all) Windows applications in a 
Linux environment.  The application database (http://appdb.winehq.org/) contains 
a fairly comprehensive list of Windows programs that have been tested by the 
user community, along with a score that corresponds to each program's level of 
functionality in Wine.  Wine is one example of how the DoD's efforts to contribute 
to open source projects might serve an incredibly large audience both inside and 
outside the U.S. government.  For example, the ICS Viewer, which is discussed 
 46
in Chapter II, Section A5, is somewhat functional under Wine.  Many official U.S. 
Air Force forms can be opened and viewed with ICS Viewer under Wine on a 
Linux system (Figure 1), but text entry is problematic at best.  DoD code 
contributions to Wine might resolve not only this, but various other problems 




Figure 1.   ICS Viewer in Wine on Red Hat Linux 
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3. Virtualization and Centralized Computing 
This thesis has focused largely on integrating OSS-based systems into 
Windows environments, rather than suggesting widespread system replacement.  
However, increasing the number of primarily OSS-based desktops in the 
enterprise reduces the number of licenses required for Microsoft Windows and 
any proprietary software that runs on it, such as Microsoft Office, Adobe Acrobat, 
etc.    The goal of proprietary license reduction need not conflict entirely with the 
needs of specific users who take full advantage of features that may only be 
available on Windows-based systems.  Several technologies exist to allow 
efficient use of a limited number of proprietary software licenses.  These include 
virtualization, remote/centralized computing, and application streaming. 
“Virtualization” is perhaps the loudest buzzword in desktop computing 
technology in 2008.  It is a technique whereby a guest operating system can be 
run inside a virtual environment, controlled by a “hypervisor” or “virtual machine 
monitor.”  Until quite recently, the hypervisor on desktop systems had to be run 
inside a complete host operating system (Figure 2), a technique which severely 
limited the speed and scalability of guest systems.  However, currently available 
workstation and server processors contain the ability to allow hardware-assisted 
virtualization, whereby system resources are shared to the hypervisor at a 
hardware level, sometimes with no full host operating system running underneath 
the guests.  This greatly increases speed and efficiency, and allows for better 
sharing of the hardware resources between the guest operating systems.   
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Figure 2.   Windows in VMware on Red Hat Linux 
 
Traditional centralized desktop computing, known as the “terminal server” 
system, provides on-demand access to a complete operating environment, 
entirely hosted on a server and delivered live over the network.  This remote 
window to the operating environment places great demands on the network, and 
is known for its user-unfriendliness where rich media is involved.  Screen 
updates can be painfully slow, such that working with simple presentations is 
difficult, and multimedia playback (let alone editing) is not advisable.  For many 
core business applications, though, terminal server setups offer a cost-effective 
way for a subset of users to access Microsoft Windows profiles from any device 




Figure 3.   Windows Remote Desktop from Linux 
 
Hybrid solutions now exist to address the shortcomings of remote 
computing, incorporating a melding of both remote desktop and virtualization 
technologies.  The recently released XenDesktop product from Citrix is one such 




Figure 4.   Citrix XenDesktop Virtualization 
Source:  http://www.citrix.com 
 
 
Figure 5.   Vmware Virtual Desktop Infrastructure 
Source: http://www.vmware.com 
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C. HETEROGENEOUS MIX AND SUPPORT CHALLENGES 
1. End Users 
If users are expected to migrate to new applications in a foreign OSS 
environment, they may require retraining, bringing a significant new cost into the 
equation.  Authors of OSS desktop software have been increasingly keen to 
avoid this problem.  Their recent work has demonstrated an understanding that, 
in order to spur adoption, they must design their programs to operate (at least on 
the surface) in a manner similar to their Microsoft Windows counterparts.  In fact, 
the general “look and feel” of the Windows Graphical User Interface (GUI) has 
been all but replicated in a majority of Linux distributions such as RHEL, Novell’s 
SUSE Linux, Canonical’s Ubuntu Linux and others.  Intermediate-level Windows 
users can very likely accomplish general productivity tasks in these OSS 
operating systems with little or no familiarization training.  “Whilst the first 
versions of Linux were fairly difficult to use for non-technicians, the product is 
widely considered to have matured at the end of the 1990s and now there is no 
significant difference in terms of  ease of use between Windows and most 
commercial Linux operating systems” (European Commission, 2004, p. 127).  
The same holds true for OpenOffice.org, the primary OSS competitor to the 
Microsoft Office suite. 
2. Systems Administrators 
Initial purchase costs are rather simple to determine and incorporate into 
an overall budget, but they only account for a fraction of the overall system life 
cycle costs.  Approximately 60 to 80 percent of a program’s software costs fall in 
Post Deployment Software Support (Petross, MN3331 lecture, Winter 2008).  
While having a heterogeneous mix of systems may offer security benefits, it 
almost certainly comes at a price. 
All claims of simplicity and compatibility of OSS described throughout this 
document are highly reliant upon an end user operating environment that has 
been expertly crafted and maintained by a truly skilled group of systems 
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integrators and administrators.  While this is also true of most proprietary 
software networks, there is indeed a need for a different skill set, especially in the 
case of Linux systems administration.  Again, the common themes of strong 
centralized standardization and control are paramount.  Fortunately, DoD 
networks are evolving in this direction more every year, so adding OSS into this 
structure might not be so daunting a challenge as it would have been a decade 
ago.   
A separate systems management framework also can present additional 
costs both in physical systems and administrator training.  This issue cannot be 
swept aside or taken lightly, but it is also broad enough to warrant its own 
separate review outside of this document.  Fortunately, OSS systems 
management options have matured beyond their simple command line roots into 
much more user-friendly (and GUI-based) tools.  The command line interface 
(CLI) is still an option if administrators prefer it, but programs like Webmin make 
user management and other systems administration a point-and-click affair.  
Similarly, the Red Hat Network (RHN) makes it rather trivial to manage a large 
number of systems via a web interface, providing software installation and 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY MANAGERS 
1. Official Guidance Overview 
Several years ago, a MITRE report stated that “at present, FOSS is 
neither approved nor disapproved in most parts of the DoD.  This limbo status 
makes program, project, and developer decisions regarding FOSS difficult” 
(MITRE, 2003, p. 22).  Fortunately, in the intervening years, several national, 
DoD and service-level policies have been released which clarify the status of 
OSS, put it on a level playing field with proprietary, closed-source software and 
provide relevant guidance for acquisitions professionals.   
At the national level, The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
reminds senior procurement executives that OSS licenses differ from proprietary 
software licenses and “may affect the use, the security, and the total cost of 
ownership of the software and must be considered when an agency is planning a 
software acquisition” (U.S. OMB, 2004).  In the DoD, Chief Information Officer 
John Stenbit released a memo to the services in 2003 stating that “DoD 
Components acquiring, using or developing OSS must ensure that the OSS 
complies with the same DoD policies that govern Commercial off the Shelf 
(COTS) and Government off the Shelf (GOTS) software” (U.S. DoD CIO, 2003).  
Finally, the U.S. Navy’s Chief Information Officer wrote “A key piece in supporting 
the DoD goal is the ability to utilize OSS as part of the Department of the Navy’s 
(DoN’s) Information Technology (IT) portfolio” (U.S. DoN, 2007).  These policy 
letters serve to reinforce the status of OSS as a viable alternative in DoD 
software development and acquisitions. 
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2. Open Architecture in Government Contracting 
For the software-savvy acquisitions professional, the thought of employing 
OSS in any given project most likely summons conflicting feelings of elation and 
apprehension.  Elation comes from the prospect of low or non-existent initial and 
recurring licensing fees for the software.  But apprehension creeps in at the 
thought of all the unknowns.  Will the existing workforce be able to easily and 
effectively use and/or maintain the system?  If not, how much training will be 
required?  What kinds of impacts will the OSS have on interoperability, both 
within the organization and with external systems and users?  The answers to 
these questions and many others, when combined with raw dollar purchase 
prices, will help to determine a system’s Total Cost of Ownership (TCO).  
Proprietary software vendors often note the aforementioned questions as drivers 
of potentially higher TCO when considering OSS.  Indeed, these factors must be 
weighed against benefits to bring the acquisitions authority closer to the desired 
outcome of “best value” in government contracting.  In the end, the decision 
about whether or not to employ OSS for a given task will depend on whether or 
not it is the best tool for the job, when all factors (including those addressed in 
this document) are taken into consideration. 
OSS has been (perhaps unwittingly) given a second-tier status by some 
acquisitions authorities, although it often comes closer to the standards that are 
set for weapon system procurements.  When the DoD prepares a multi-billion-
dollar contract for aircraft or vehicle construction, it mandates that the vendor 
must supply technical drawings and schematics along with the delivered 
hardware.  The same applies to construction or upgrades of military facilities.  
This is done in order to ensure that internal, organic maintenance units, as well 
as contracted third parties, can perform any required service on the vehicle or 
structure.  Without such supporting documentation, DoD agencies would be 
indefinitely locked into one vendor for weapon system support, a concept that is 
shunned in the acquisitions community.  Yet somehow, this standard does not 
carry over to the desktop computer software world.  Vendors typically deliver 
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proprietary code that cannot be extended, updated or otherwise modified by a 
third party, precisely due to lack of source code and adequate documentation. 
In September of 2007, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (DFARS) was amended, instructing contracting officers to more 
carefully consider DoD long-term needs for technical data rights for weapon 
systems.  This was mandated specifically to allow a strategy that includes “the 
development of maintenance capabilities within DoD; or competition for contracts 
for sustainment of the system or subsystems” (DFARS 207.106).  Additionally, 
the supplement states: 
Although the law does not address requirements for computer 
software, it is long-standing DoD policy to apply the same or similar 
requirements to both technical data and computer software, since 
many issues are common to both. Therefore, this interim DFARS 
rule applies to both technical data and computer software. 
The “technical data rights,” translated in preceding paragraph to also 
cover computer software rights, could reasonably be interpreted to include 
program source code and access to any API documentation that the DoD might 
require to maintain the software and/or allow for future sustainment contracts 
through competing corporations.   
 The U.S. Navy's Program Executive Office for Integrated Warfare Systems 
has taken a leadership role in promoting open architectures in DoD contracting, 
and its Naval Open Architecture (NOA) Guidebook for Program Managers also 
addresses the need for government rights to technical data: 
NOA is the confluence of business and technical practices yielding 
modular, interoperable systems that adhere to open standards with 
published interfaces. This approach significantly increases 
opportunities for innovation and competition, enables re-use of 
components, facilitates rapid technology insertion, and reduces 
maintenance constraints. NOA delivers increased warfighting 
capabilities in a shorter time at reduced cost. The U.S. 
Government’s (hereinafter “Government”) ability to acquire at least 
Government Purpose Rights (GPR) to data and intellectual property 
and to minimize proprietary elements to the lowest component level 
is critical to this effort. 
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 While it is true that open architecture does not directly equate to open 
source, the two tend to go hand-in-hand.  Most OSS packages are written around 
open communications standards and file formats.  Additionally, when open 
standards are used throughout an enterprise, it simplifies the further integration 
of OSS.  Therefore, IT managers are advised to employ open standard 
technologies wherever possible.   
 Web-based applications that conform to World Wide Web Consortium 
(W3C) standards offer cross-platform capability that can be centrally maintained 
and updated, with no client-side installation or maintenance effort.  Other 
technologies that treat software as a service, and can do so with little regard for 
client platform, offer a similarly future-proof and centrally maintainable solution.  
Such solutions almost make the desktop operating environment irrelevant, so 
long as it conforms to open standards and provides a basic set of what are 
currently considered commodity operating functions. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis includes a section on Common Access Card (CAC) technology 
and an appendix devoted to testing capabilities of Common Access Cards in 
OSS environments.  However, due to the lack of a suitable testing environment, 
there is no survey of the ability of OSS-based clients to log into Windows/Active 
Directory domains using CACs.  Several vendors, including Red Hat and 
Novell/SUSE advertise the ability to integrate Linux-based clients rather well into 
these environments.  And as previously discussed, two-factor authentication 
(usually in the form of CAC login) is mandatory throughout the DoD for access to 
the NIPRNet.  It would be of great value to continue this research by determining 
to what extent OSS-based client systems can take advantage of Windows 
domain logins (and associated controls, such as Group Policy Objects), 
particularly when using CAC authentication.   
 The full-scale integration of OSS systems goes beyond domain 
membership.  Terry Bollinger noted in his 2003 MITRE report (p. 24), OSS 
“seems to work best when people come to it, and not vice-versa.”  This approach 
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may be acceptable for smaller-scale integration of specific tools in niche 
applications.  However, it cannot be the case for large-scale, professional 
deployments of OSS-based desktop systems.  Standardization is key to healthy, 
economically viable enterprise management.  Following in the path of current 
desktop systems standard configuration efforts, OSS must be deployed in a 
similar manner.  Exactly how this should be accomplished, to what extent, and by 
whom is a topic worthy of further study. 
 This thesis began with an observation that the DoD spends millions of 
dollars each year on typical desktop computer software.  Alternatively, Open 
Source Software is often referred to as “Free Open Source Software” throughout 
the industry both because of the freedoms it affords users (modification, re-
distribution, etc.) and the fact that it is usually available free of charge.  
Paradoxically, as discussed throughout this document, the DoD is often not able 
to take advantage of all such OSS, usually due to information assurance 
regulations.  In the case of operating systems, vendors expend significant time, 
effort and money to bring OSS packages into line with DoD requirements.  DoD 
agencies are then limited to those offerings.  But must this be the case?  On one 
hand, DoD agencies might be thankful (despite the financial cost for support 
licenses) that these vendors are both interested in tackling the challenge of 
software certification, and are also willing and able to provide follow-on support.  
Alternatively, the DoD might consider a series of internally certified and 
supported OSS systems, taking some of what is currently available off-the-shelf 
and using it as a starting point for DoD-specific variants.  This might still be done 
in cooperation with OSS vendors, but at significant cost savings over typical, per-
seat support licenses.   
C. CLOSING THOUGHTS 
OSS has received increased attention within DoD technology and 
acquisition circles in recent years, and with good reason.  OSS offers solutions 
that can satisfy a majority of official business needs with (at least up-front) 
significant financial savings.  Desktop OSS is already in use on niche classified 
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systems, and is generally accepted as a secure, transparent and trusted 
alternative for personal, corporate and government use worldwide.  It can 
interface with the majority of Windows-based server and client systems widely 
used on DoD networks.  It provides portable, modular code that lends itself to 
customization, and guarantees that using agencies won't be locked into any one 
vendor or platform.  Many systems administrators and IT managers on the front 
lines of DoD networks understand these advantages, are familiar with numerous 
OSS products, and are eager to reap the benefits of those tools in an official, 
sanctioned capacity. 
 Chapter III of this document addressed the functionality delivered by the 
U.S. Air Force's Standard Desktop Configuration, and how currently available 
OSS tools might match those capabilities.  In summary, OSS offerings provided 
what might be called the 90% solution; they would likely be adequate for a 
considerable number of users performing typical office automation and 
communication tasks.  Unfortunately, the SDC does not represent the entirety of 
applications used by U.S. Air Force units.  Almost every specialized Community 
of Interest (COI) utilizes some specific set of tools that are installed on top of the 
SDC.  Some of the centralized computing tools described in Chapter IV are 
currently used to satisfy the needs of these COI's, namely remote desktop 
computing via terminal servers and Citrix-based application delivery.  These 
solutions integrate painlessly into OSS desktop environments.  The remaining 
OS-specific, locally installed applications may be problematic enough to keep 
OSS out of those offices for the time being.  Then again, in this era of stretched 
military budgets, tools that provide the 90% solution at a fraction of the cost may 
prove sufficiently attractive to military leadership to warrant replacement of the 
trouble-making niche applications. 
 OSS offers the DoD (and other branches of government) many attractive 
alternatives to proprietary desktop computer software, but the potential comes 
with a significant number of caveats.  OSS solutions are not simple drop-in 
replacements for current proprietary desktop systems.  As this document has 
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described, they can capably fulfill most typical office automation needs with a 
high level of cross-platform compatibility and a relatively low level of user 
retraining.  But the details of implementation must be carefully addressed one-by-
one in a methodical systems development life cycle approach.  Each of the 
Services has the resources to develop OSS test platforms with very low initial 
acquisition costs.  These resources must be tapped and fully utilized to drive 
standardized, top-down deployments for successful, widespread OSS 
integration.  If acquisition authorities decide to venture down the OSS path, the 
journey must be undertaken with a very high level of preparation and 
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APPENDIX A. COMMON ACCESS CARD TESTING 
A. TEST ENVIRONMENT 
This survey was conducted using various Intel IA-32 (x86) -based 
computers: one Dell Pentium IV desktop, one Dell Pentium III laptop, and one 
IBM Pentium-M laptop.  All three systems were running the Red Hat Enterprise 
Linux 5.1 Desktop with all standard installation options except SE Linux, in order 
to simplify troubleshooting.  The RHEL systems were all registered with the Red 
Hat Network (RHN) under the Naval Postgraduate School's (NPS) site license, 
allowing the simplified installation of those software packages available on the 
RHN.   
 RHEL clients use the yum (Yellowdog Updater, Modified) program to 
locate and download pre-compiled binary software packages from Red Hat's 
repositories.  A graphical front-end called Pirut makes it even easier to search or 
browse the catalog and select available programs.  However, systems registered 
with the RHN are only subscribed to a base software distribution channel by 
default, which limits the number of programs to which they have access.  To 
allow the clients to “see” the larger pool of software in Red Hat's online 
repositories, an administrator must log into the RHN and add additional sub-
channels to the profile of each computer (or group of computers).  In this study, 
the RHEL Desktop Supplementary and RHEL Desktop Workstation channels 
were enabled for all three machines. 
 Over the past several years, the SCM Microsystems SCR331 USB has 
become one of the most commonly-used CAC readers throughout the DoD.  It is 
a white plastic external device, meant to sit on a user's desktop.  Older versions 
of the reader may contain firmware that is not CCID 1.0 compatible.  Also, some 
variants sold by ActivIdentity may look physically similar, but  
unfortunately use a different firmware which is not compatible with the USB  
CCID driver.  This has been addressed in other documents, including  
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the “CAC on a Mac” literature produced at NPS 
(http://stinet.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=AD
A445103) and again in OSSG's documentation.  To summarize these previous 
findings, the older SCM readers and ActivCard (now ActivIdentity) USB 2.0 
readers can be “upgraded” so that they contain the latest firmware of the SCM 
Microsystems devices, effectively turning them into capable SCR331's.  That 
procedure was followed for this study.  One noteworthy stumbling block, 
however, was the version of ActivCard Gold middleware used on the Windows 
platform doing the upgrade.  The newer version 6.x, which is being distributed by 
the U.S. Air Force for home use, would not perform the firmware flash; the result 
was consistently a complete system crash (blue screen).  When this middleware 
was removed and replaced with the older ActivCard 3.x, the flash process 
worked.    
 The Dell SK3106 keyboard and newer Dell smart card keyboards (in use 
at computer labs around NPS) were also used in this study and worked without 
any modification. 
B. FIREFOX WEB BROWSER 
Firefox is the default web browser bundled with RHEL 5, and there are two 
ways of making it operate with CAC's.  The first (and simplest) method is to use 
Network Security Services (NSS) files provided by DISA's Open Source Steering 
Group (OSSG): 
1. From a computer with a NIPRNet connection (address that resolves to 
.mil), go to http://ossg.disa.mil/projects/linuxcac/ and download the RPM 
(Red Hat Package Manager) files containing the DoD CA certificates. 
2. Close Firefox. 
3. Install the RPMs by double-clicking them. 
4. Go to your home folder, and click on View, then Show Hidden Files.   
5. Browse to the ./mozilla/firefox directory.  There, you will see one more 
folder made of a random-looking series of characters; this is the profile 
directory.  Open that folder. 
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6. Backup (change the names of) cert8.db and secmod.db files, as they will 
be replaced. 
7. Copy the cert8.db and secmod.db files from /etc/pki/nssdb (provided by 
OSSG's RPMs) to the Firefox profile directory where the originals were 
found in the previous step. 
 
 All of the DoD CA's are now loaded into Firefox's Certificate Authorities list 
(courtesy of the cert8.db file), and a new PKCS#11 security module has been 
loaded as a security device (from the secmod.db file).  Upon visiting a CAC-
enabled website, you should be prompted for your “master password”, which is 
your PIN. 
 Alternatively, the PKCS#11 module can be manually added as a security 
device from within Firefox: 
1. Under the Preferences, Advanced menu, Security tab, click on Security 
Devices, then the Load button. 
2. Choose any name for the Module Name, and specify the path to the 
Coolkey library (in RHEL5, use:  /usr/lib/pkcs11/libcoolkeypk11.so). 
 
 Upon restarting the browser with the CAC inserted in the reader, the token 
will be accessible to the system, but will not typically be used unless all required 
DoD Certificate Authorities (CA) have been manually imported as well.  One 
method is to export individual CA certificate files from Internet Explorer on a 
Windows client, then import them one by one into Firefox.  This is a very tedious 
process, especially compared with the simplicity of copying the cert8.db file 
provided by OSSG.  
 As an added benefit, OpenOffice.org automatically takes advantage of 
NSS secmod.db and cert8.db files that have been loaded in the user's Firefox 
profile.  Therefore, after the steps above have been completed, OpenOffice.org 
can also use the CAC to digitally sign documents (though only if they are saved 
in the OpenDocument .odt format). 
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C. EVOLUTION E-MAIL CLIENT 
A similar procedure must be followed to gain CAC functionality in Evolution.  
First, install the OSSG CA RPMs as described above. 
 
1. From a computer with a NIPRNet connection (address that resolves to 
.mil), go to http://ossg.disa.mil/projects/linuxcac/ and download the RPM 
files containing the CA certificates. 
2. Go to your home folder and click View, then Show Hidden Files. 
3. Browse to the .evolution directory. 
4. Backup (change the names of) cert8.db and secmod.db files, as they will 
be replaced. 
5. Copy the cert8.db and secmod.db files from /etc/pki/nssdb to the 
~/.evolution directory (in step 3). 
 
 Again, there is a manual install method (provided by a Navy Research 
Labs website: (https://airborne.nrl.navy.mil/PKI ), but this is not recommended 
since one must still import all the CA certificates manually.  From a command 
prompt in your home directory, simply type: 
 
modutil -add "Coolkey" -libfile /usr/lib/pkcs11/libcoolkeypk11.so -dbdir .evolution 
 Once the CAC is working in Evolution, it is possible to sign emails 
immediately, but one must still obtain the public keys of recipients in order to 
send encrypted emails.  For this purpose, DISA's Global Directory Service Query 
(https://dod411.gds.disa.mil/) is invaluable.  Simply search for a DoD user, then 
download their public key and import it into Evolution by going to Edit, 
Preferences, Certificates, the Contact Certificates tab, and clicking Import.  Be 
sure to have your CAC inserted before visiting the GDS Query site. 
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